In the first four centuries of Islam in Iran, mosques were arguably the only sacred places for Iranian Muslims to pray. It was only after the invasion of the Mongolians and the resulting expansion of Shi'ism and Sufism throughout the country that the tombs of some sacred figures, including Imams' grandchildren ('Imamzadehs') or ('Maqbarahs'), became shrines and important sites for pilgrims. It is interesting that pilgrimage to both Imams' shrines and Imamzadehs and their associated expressions and perceptions lie at the center of the Shi'ite experience of 'religion', although they are rarely mentioned in the relevant core sources of Shi'ism. Nevertheless, to borrow a Weberian image, during the Islamic revolution of 1979, mosques became the 'vehicles' for the religio-political ideology of the revolution. Unlike Imamzadehs, they embraced dissidents from a variety of social classes, ranging from emigrants from rural areas to educated liberals and intellectuals. In the fortieth anniversary of the revolution, the findings of my three-year research project illustrates that whilst the religious status of mosques is decreasing, Imamzadehs as well as other venues detached from Islamic authority and political Islam are increasingly becoming 'vehicles' for ideas and sentiments for the expression of more individualistic and 'spiritual' sensations, rather than the manifestation of an established and institutionalized religio-political ideology. Taking inspiration from a social constructionist approach, discourse and content analysis of media, participant observation in 'Shi'ite' venues situated in three provinces, particularly three Imamzadehs or Maqbarahs, and thirty semi-structured interviews in north-west Iran, this article aims to report the findings of this project by focusing on the meanings of 'religion' (and 'non-religion') and 'spiritual' (and 'non-spiritual') attached to these venues, including Imamzadehs, and their material culture as well as the changes our informants have experienced in this regard through time and space, particularly during the last forty years. 'Inspired by this fundamental thought [the great significance of mosques in early Islam], with the emphasis of the Leader of the revolution [Ayatollah Khomeini], the Iranian Muslim nation turned mosques back to their fully mobile and vital status as in early Islam during the current of the Islamic revolution, particularly one year before and after the triumph of the revolution. And [using mosques] the combatant [revolutionary] clergy explained the political thought of Islam, disseminated the movement's goals and disclosed the [pre-revolutionary] regime's catastrophes, the sinister effects of foreign domination and the global imperialist plots, especially that of the United States and Zionism, in the trench of altar and pulpit . . . In summary, mosques changed to forceful centers for the support of the revolution and the operation headquarters of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution at that time. And the Islamic Republic of Iran was born in mosques . . . Against the danger of the separation of the revolution from mosques, which was the Islamic revolution's new plot, Imam Khomeini (pbuh) said: "Don't be scared of the enemy's [military] jets; be scared of [the day when] mosques become empty."' [
provides further evidence for the presence of the political ideology of 'Islamism' at that time. Since then, there was a gradual amalgamation of Islamist forces with mostly Western-educated intelligentsia and what might be called 'liberal' activists, who were shaken by the 1953 Coup, which, together with other factors, paved the way for the revolution of 1979.
Among the intelligentsia, as Abrahamian (1982, pp. 462-73) highlights, the Sorbonne-educated Dr Ali Shari'ati's role is perhaps critical and incomparable with others, such as Ayatollahs Taleqani, Beheshti and Motahhari. Having said this, his modernist support for democracy and social justice was largely ignored in the post-revolutionary era and Ayatollah Khomeini refused even to mention his name amongst the influential figures (Godazgar 2000) . Influenced by revivalist movements against colonialism and imperialism, especially in north Africa, and intelligentsia, such as Frantz Fanon, Dr Shari'ati blew a new spirit to the dying body of Islam among the educated youth by politicizing it and making it relevant to the modern world. He distinguished between Safavid Shi'ism ('tashayyo'e safavi'), which he described as quietist, and Alavid Shi'ism ('tashayyo'e alavi'), meaning 'true Shi'ism-the exemplary of which was its first Imam, Ali'-which was supposed to be revolutionary. He also intensely criticized the Islamic 'ulama, who were viewed as 'ignorant' of the main message of 'Islam' and the main philosophy of Imam Hussain's uprising against despotism and the aristocratic rule of the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid bin Mo'avieh. His lectures in the modern building of the Hussainiyeh-e Ershad in north Tehran were widely published and attracted the attention of many educated youth. These publications along with other 'Islamic' publications, 'mushrooming' religious associations and Islamist guerrilla organizations, boosted the 'religious' sentiment of the public to the extent that the Qur'an became the bestseller in 1973, with 700,000 copies sold, while Mafatih al-Jenan [Keys to the Heaven], a very traditional Shi'ite book composed of highly other-worldly prayers, became the second bestseller, with 490,000 copies sold (Arjomand 1989, p. 92) .
It was interesting and perhaps shocking, as Milani (2011) elaborates, that the Shah himself and his omnipresent intelligence service, titled 'SAVAK' (National Organization for Security and Intelligence), ignored such 'Islamist' revivalist activities and the ensuing atmosphere until it was too late. The Shah thought that 'Islam' and the clerics were in general uninfluential, except as appropriate tools in combating leftists. Furthermore, in his view, activist Islamists, whom he regarded as 'erteja'e siah' (radically reactionary 1 ), were, he thought, too few to have any impact at a societal level. The global secret services, such as those of the USA (Emery 2013, p. 621; Halliday 1999, p. 172) , the UK (Ansari 2019) and the former Soviet Union (Volkov 2019; Halliday 1999, p. 172) agreed with this analysis, as did scholars, such as Nikki Keddie (1983, p. 579) , Fred Halliday (1999 , p. 188), Michel Foucault (1978 and Edward Said (1980, p. 23 ) and indeed many leftist and rightist European and American intelligentsia or 'political scientists of all stripes', as Halliday (1999, p. 172) explains. It was against such expectations that the Iranian revolution finally, and so rapidly, happened, toppling the well-armed and Western-supported regime of the Shah under the banner of the political ideology of 'Shi'ite Islam' and 'religion': what I refer to in this article as 'Islamism'.
In the post-revolutionary era, 'Islamism', amalgamated with 'cultural nationalism' and 'populism', have ruled Iran with varying degrees (Godazgar 2008, pp. 62-80) . 'Islamism', in this context, means that 'Islam', as the highest-ranked social institution with its so-called 'agents' (clerics), 'is fervently believed to be the foundation of a good society, and the whole society should be based on Islamic values.' (Godazgar 2008, p. 75) . 'Islamic values' embrace the political ideologies of anti-Westernism, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism as well as a specific stress on 'being welded into the principle of Jurist Guardianship' (zob shodan dar vali-e faqih), as the 'Deputy of the Hidden Imam'. This would also require an acceptance of theocracy and active participation in mosques as the official and legitimate centers for worship and Shi'ite rituals. The commemoration ceremonies of Imams, especially Tasu'a 1 The literal translation of 'erteja'e siah' is 'black reactionary.' However, 'radically reactionary' conveys a clearer contextual meaning of the term in English. and Ashra, were transformed into political statements in favor of the Islamic authorities. This was achieved by holding religio-political requiems and by portraying the images of the authorities, in particular that of Ayatollah Khomeini. For the first time since perhaps the influential rule of Shah Abbas I (1588-1629) of the Safavid Empire , during which official Friday prayers were established under a Shi'ite state, comparable to those held in the Sunni Ottoman Empire, Friday prayers were established in an official and organized way in July 1979 (Algar 2011) . In mosques and Musallas (venues for Friday prayers), people were now required to listen to government-authorized clerics and to defend 'Islamic values' and the Islamic Leader as the 'Hussain of our time' as part of their 'Islamic' duty of 'enjoining good and preventing vice' (amr be ma'aroof va nahy az monkar). A further aspect of these newly defined 'Islamic values' was a specific stress on sex segregation and the veiling of women as a means of imposing moral purity. Indeed, as Amid-Zanjani (Amid-Zanjani 2012, pp. 41-42) stresses in the quotation above, mosques, scattered across the cities, towns and villages of Iran, provided critical bases and networks for the dissemination of these politicized 'Shi'ite values' or 'Islamism' and other revolutionary activities, including the mobilization of the mass ('Basij') to voluntarily participate in the Iraq-Iran war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , during the revolution and in the early life of the Islamic Republic. Forty years after the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the religio-political ideology of 'Islamism' are still in place. Yet, the question I address here is: Are people still loyal to such 'Islamic values'? If not, what are their definitions of 'Islam' in today's Iranian context? Are mosques still functioning as the major sites of the Iranian Muslims' 'religiosity'? If not, what are the alternatives, if any?
'Islam' in Its Fourth Decade: Methods and Findings
In this article, I argue for two major points: first, that there has been a decline in mosque-centered Islam, which has taken on a different meaning than it had in both pre-and revolutionary eras; and, second, that there has been a rise in individualized or semi-individualized 'spiritualistic' Islam, which is distinguished from 'Sufism' and the 'spirituality' of ancient Iran found in 'religions' such as Mandaeism, Manichaeism and Mazdakism (Foltz 2004) . I have adopted a triangulation research method in order to demonstrate the above-mentioned trends. For the former, I have used media sources that cite the general complaints of Iranian mosque leaders as well as participant and non-participant observations. For the latter, I have gathered data through participant observation and semi-structured interviews with thirty individuals in three provinces in north-west Iran.
(a) Decline of mosque-centered 'Islam' and 'Islamism' According to Shi'ite jurisprudence, until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Friday prayers were largely believed to be solely performable under the imamate of an 'innocent Imam' ('Imam-i ma'soum'), i.e., the twelve Imams. However, some jurists disagreed with this conventional belief and therefore there have been cases of performing Friday prayers in different eras, including the Pahlavi period, in mostly major cities, such as the capital (for more information, see Algar 2011 ). Yet, such prayers were significantly incomparable with those of the post-revolutionary era, in terms of both forms and scopes. In post-revolutionary Iran, Friday prayers were established and institutionalized in a centralized form by the Islamic leader as the legitimate Shi'ite authority (vali-e amr), who was involved in the appointment of Imam Jom'ehs in cities and towns throughout Iran. The first Friday Prayer was established with the Imamate of Ayatollah Seyyed [descendant of the Prophet] Mahmud Taleqani, who was widely regarded as a 'liberal and open-minded' Islamic scholar, in Tehran on 28 July 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini gradually appointed Imam Jom'ehs for other Iranian cities soon after. As long as he was alive, although all Friday Prayers were established in a centralized form, their sermons ('khotbehs') were non-centralized. That is, it was up to each Imam Jom'eh to decide what he needed to say to his audience during his sermons. However, during his successor's leadership, all Friday Prayer sermons were directed throughout the country by the Central Headquarters of the Friday Prayers (Setad-e markazi-e namaz-e jom'eh), which was established in 1990. Its defined goals were: 'the expansion [of Friday Prayers] in order to promote the awareness of mainly the youth and teenagers towards religio-political affairs and a full imitation of the Guardianship of the Jurist (vilayat-e faqih)', 'defending the values of the Islamic Revolution' and 'the encouragement of the people to participation in society and collaboration for the advancement of the goals of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.' (Khatami 2019) This means that all appointed Imam Jom'ehs throughout the country have been required since then to follow orders in terms of what to say in their sermons in each Friday Prayer, which they receive weekly from the Islamic Leader, who is himself officially the Imam Jom'eh of Tehran.
On the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the first Friday Prayers, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the ultra-conservative Temporary Imam Jom'eh of Tehran, alongside other Islamic Leader-appointed Imams of Jom'eh throughout the country, acknowledged on Friday 26 July 2019 that Friday Prayers have become 'empty'. Confirming that Friday Prayers are 'the microphones of the Vilayat [the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist]', Khatami called for assistance from the media in this regard: ' . . . the audible, written and virtual media are to help Friday Prayer[s] and not to be content that Friday Prayer[s] have become empty' (Khatami 2019) . The dramatic decline in the number of participants in prayers is neither new nor confined to Friday Prayers. This has been a subject of discussion especially among 'reformist' newspapers, such as Bahar and E'temad, since at least May 2017, but this was the first time that this issue was acknowledged by Friday Imams themselves, who describe such a decline as 'dangerous'.
The 'emptiness' of Friday Prayers is also confirmed by Ayatollah Mohsen Gharavian, an influential member and teacher of the Qum seminary of Hawzeh Elmiyyeh: 'Friday Prayers lack the previous status nowadays. The main reason for the lack of people's participation, especially the educated youth, in Friday prayers is the weakness of their analytical and scientific contents, which either does not exist at all or hardly exists' (Salam-i No 2019) . By suggesting this, Gharavian is implying that Friday prayers have simply turned into political ideological propaganda and people are not interested in this anymore. This is also confirmed by a retired professor of political sciences at the University of Tehran, Sadiq Zibakalam. In an interview with E'temad newspaper, he attributes the decline of participation in Friday and collective prayers in mosques to the 'politicization of prayers and the incorporation of the microphones of prayers into the government structure' and suggests: 'we witness the microphones of Friday and collective prayers have no independent views from the ruling [establishment] and what is requested from the Imams [of Jom'eh and Jama'at] is echoed from these microphones.' (Khatami 2019; Salam-i No 2019) . It is interesting that, in a report about Friday prayers in Iran in the last forty years, Deutsche Welle, a German broadcaster, illustrates the change that has taken place from the mainly youthful participation of the Friday prayers in the early years of the revolution to the 'grey hair' participation nowadays (Khatami 2019) .
The dramatic decline in the participation of prayers is not restricted to Friday Prayers or 'musallas', where Friday prayers take place. It also includes mosques and the daily Collective Prayers (namaz-e jama'at). This was also acknowledged by Ayatollah Ali Khatami, the Imam Jum'eh of the major city of Zanjan in the north-west Iran on 28 May 2019, in complaining about the 'emptiness of collective prayers in mosques' and calling it 'a cultural concern that requires appropriate cultural tasks' (Khatami 2019) . Indeed, the decline of the mosque-centered and organized 'Islam' and 'Islamism' is also confirmed by the participant and non-participant observations that took place in mosques and musallahs in north-west Iran. Despite the fact that the offices of the Headquarters in each city provides free transportation to the centralized Friday Prayer venues (musallas), they were frequently observed to be mostly empty. Instead, the Friday Prayers' audiences are packed with soldiers or, on some occasions, school pupils who are forced to attend such prayers. Similarly, the number of attendees in Collective Prayers in mosques, which are mainly situated in the populated areas of the bazaars, often did not exceed one row, especially during noon prayers.
The decline of mosque-centered 'Islam' and 'Islamism' was also confirmed by the interviews. Out of thirty, only seven informants stated the 'mosque' as a venue for their 'Islamic' activities-of which, only two mentioned the 'mosque' as their sole and exclusive venue. That is, the other five informants merely gave preference to the 'mosque' over other possible venues with different degrees and reasons.
A forty-five-year-old male civil servant with a degree in Islamic Jurisprudence, who solely chose the 'mosque', stated: 'Mosque is the best and the most appropriate place for the [moral] training of teenagers and the youth, expressing your personal feelings ['ehsasat-e shakhsi'] and acquiring inner peace ['araamesh-e darouni']. It is the house of God.' Another informant, a twenty-six-year-old woman and teaching fellow at a university with a family background in the revolutionary guards, mentioned:
'In my view, the faithful must choose mosques, which are the houses of God, but the majority of the Iranian people prefer to make pilgrimages to Imams' or Imamzadehs' tombs rather than attending mosques these days. Mosque is the house of God and, in my view, is the most sacred place for [having] conversations [with God] ['raz va niaz'] and for the expression of religious emotions ['ehsasat-e mazhabi']'.
It was interesting that even these two informants, who solely chose the mosque as a venue for their 'religious' activities, mentioned no term related to 'political Islam' or shari'a as part of their 'religious' commitment or sensation for attending mosques. These interviews and the non-participant observation also confirm that the decline of participation in Collective and Friday prayers has not occurred over night, but has happened gradually over the past forty years, especially during the last two decades. I now turn to the question of 'Where have the congregations gone?' and 'What has happened to their "religiosity"?'
(b) Rise of individualized or semi-individualized 'spiritualistic Islam' My strategy for this part of the research comprised participation observation in the three provinces of East Azarbaijan, West Azarbaijan and Ardabil, which are situated in north-west Iran, as well as thirty semi-structured interviews focused on Tabriz, the capital city of East Azarbaijan in 2015-2017. 2 Participant observation included observations of mosques and 'Imamzadehs' (the tombs of presumed grandsons of Shi'ite Imams), 'maqbarahs' (the tombs of reputed saints), Friday prayer venues called 'musallas', university mosques, 'Hussainiyehs', congregation halls for commemoration ceremonies of Shi'ite Imams, and public spaces such as streets, especially during the Shi'ite rituals of Tasu'a and Ashura. This method was adopted due to the 'complexity' of the social context in which 'religious' change was occurring (Darlington and Scott 2002, pp. 74-76; Atkinson and Coffey 2001, p. 812 ). In addition, after identifying the fact that there were other groups of Iranian Shi'ites that avoided public spaces for performing their 'religious' sensations, a snowball sampling method was adopted in order to interview further informants who were not easily visible for 'ideological or political reasons' and given the 'sensitivity' of the topic (Corbetta 2003, p. 222; Gray 2014, p. 223) . However, in order not to compromise the diversity of the sample frame, I made sure to specify the required characteristics of new sample members from diverse backgrounds in terms of age, gender, education, marriage, occupation and social class (Ritchie et al. 2003, p. 94; May 2011, p. 145; Gray 2014, p. 223) . It was important to make sure that the diversities of the definitions of 'Islam' were explored.
In terms of the analysis of the qualitative data, influenced by Asad (1993) and Foucault (1972) , and due to consistency with the theoretical approach of 'social constructionism' (Beckford 1989 (Beckford , 2003 , 2 The Province of Ardabil was a part of the Province of East Azarbaijan until March 1993. The vast majority of these three provinces speak the Azarian Turkic language and are Twelver Shi'ite Muslims. They also border the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north with the same name, language and religion (Shi'ism). The Republic of Azerbaijan, along with other Caucasian territories (namely Georgia, Armenia and the Republic of Dagestan), was a part of Iran until the 19th century, when Iran lost these territories to Russia during two wars (1804-1813 and 1826-1828) . Although the Republic of Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Iranian provinces of Azarbaijan (along with those of Ardabil, Zanjan and to some extent Hamadan), on the other, share the same language and religion, they are sharply divided in terms of politics and the definitions of what counts as 'Islamic Shi'ism'. After all, they have historically experienced totally different discourses during the last two centuries. The Republic of Azerbaijan has been subject to Imperial Russian and Soviet rule for around two centuries, with literally little relationship with Iran, including the Azarbaijan provinces. In addition, like other parts of Iran, many Iranian Azarians consider the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and others as the lost lands and blame the Iranian Qajar dynasty kings for these losses. Therefore, the 'religious' lives of the people of all these three provinces are typical of Iranian society, rather than being similar to those of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, this is also very clear from the critical roles these provinces have played in Iranian social upheavals such as the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 -1909 and the 'Islamic' Revolution of 1977 -1979 (for more information in this regard, see Abrahamian 1982). this project has adopted a 'Critical Discourse Analysis' approach, according to which 'discourses', in the sense of patterns of beliefs, customary actions and language, are major conventional ways via which 'ideology', in the sense of 'a set of interrelated ideas' that are associated with power, are produced, re-produced and disseminated (Johnstone 2002, pp. 45-55) . That is, I attempt to identify and comprehend the discourses, portrayed via participant observations and semi-structured interviews, by exploring the meanings of our informants' forms of language and activities and trying to find 'ties' or connections between these forms in order to understand the power structure and its impact on the society in which the properties of change and continuity occur (Van Dijk 2001, pp. 352-58; Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 2004, pp. 14-22) . All informants, apart from one, were from Shi'ite backgrounds. Due to the flexibility of the method and giving priority to the identification of, and understanding the quality, of change, a semi-structured method of interviews was adopted (Burns 2000, pp. 424-25; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 130) . The interviewees represent mainly lower and middle classes from an age range of 18 to 62 years. There were 16 women and 14 men, with an educational level ranging from primary school to doctoral studies: four below the equivalent of GCSEs, eleven with GCSE, A-levels and national diplomas-equivalent qualifications and fifteen with bachelor's degree and above. Nearly half of them came from a state-employment background and the other half from a private sector or bazaar background. All the questions asked were about 'Islamic' activities and sensing 'religion', including when, where, and how these sensations and activities occur.
Using the above-mentioned methods, I argue here that Iranians have diversified the forms of their 'religiosity' by creating and defining a variety of new venues and forms of 'Islam' that are overall indicative of an individualized or semi-individualized 'spiritualistic Islam'. Following Beckford (2003, pp. 71-72) , by 'spiritualism' (ma'anaviyat-garaei), I mean individualized, subjectivized and fragmentized definitions of 'Islam' that, under the influence of societal conditions and global forces, are 'socially constructed' in ways in which they go beyond the objective political or apolitical meanings defined by institutional or organized Islam in the Iranian context: the 're-location of the sacred' from 'institutional Islam' to 'individualized Islam'. In this sense, 'spiritualism' avoids and often loathes organized 'Islamism' or the political ideology of Islam, which has dominated the discourse of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, and also resists non-ideological and shari'a-centered 'Islam' as an institutional religion, which was the characteristic of pre-revolutionary Iran. For Beckford (2003, p. 72) , these subjective or individualistic forms of spirituality are the characteristics of late modernity, to be distinguished from medieval Europe and the Pietist movement in 17th and 18th century Germany. In medieval Europe, Christian churches used and/or encouraged 'spirituality' as an institutional apparatus in order to regulate their members' lives in the form of training or discipline. In contrast, today's 'spiritualism' tends to embrace 'a variety of largely voluntary beliefs and practices which are expected to enhance the capacity of individuals to, e.g., realize their full potential or achieve "authenticity" to their "true" self-without any necessary connection to any particular religious tradition or institution.' (Beckford 2019) . His main point is that there has been a historical shift in the definition of 'spiritualism' from the former to the latter: 'This shift . . . is associated with very broad social and cultural changes such as the declining importance of 'attributed' identities (or status) and the rising importance of 'achieved' identities; the declining importance of membership in all kinds of voluntary organisations (churches, trade unions, political parties, etc.); the growth of 'identity politics'; and the growing interest in cultivating 'the self' as a life-long project which may produce different views of the self at different stages of life. These changes have all accelerated in the global and digital era (especially through social media); and they help to draw a clearer distinction between 'religion' (as a matter of collective discipline, regulation, tradition) and 'spirituality' (as something that is freely chosen to be cultivated by individuals).' (Beckford 2019) Although this shift 'is most noticeable in the liberal capitalist world', it is not limited to it (for example, see Fedele and Knibbe 2013; Godazgar 2007) . In this sense, my definition of 'spiritualized Islam' is distinguished from both 'Sufism' and the 'spirituality' of ancient Iranian 'religions' (Foltz 2004) , although I believe that both of them are important 'cultural resources', to borrow Demerath's (2002 ( , p. 21, cited in Beckford 2003 term, for the present-day individualized 'spiritualistic Islam', which is 'modern' in Eisenstadt's (2003) sense. While, 'modern spiritualism' in the contemporary Iranian context shares to some extent with 'Sufism' elements of intercession (shefa'at), mediation (tavassol) and entreaty (talab-e hajat), especially in the act of pilgrimage to Imamzadehs, it does not share with it Sufism's critical element of having a tutelage (pir or morshed), which is highly hierarchical and organizational. That is, unlike Sufism, 'modern spiritualism,' in the Iranian context, is neither institutionalized nor organized. In addition, intercession in Sufism is mainly spiritual in other-worldly forms. Yet, intercession in 'modern spiritualism' can take both this-worldly (physical and materialistic) and other-worldly or metaphysical forms. Iranian 'ancient spiritualism' also has a commonality with 'modern spiritualism'. Both of them emphasize the significance of 'coming from the heart', 'genuineness' and lack of 'duplicity' (ri'a and tazahor) and indeed any type of 'formalism', including institutional or organizational formations. However, 'modern spiritualism' is distinguished from 'ancient spiritualism' in the sense that the modern version is shaped by global forces and conditions of late modernity such as satellite TV, internet, migration and social media. In brief, 'modern spiritualized Islam' may be considered a response to a person's individualistic and subjective needs that arise from the new societal conditions that one might associate with 'late modernity' or 'post-modernity', which may be materialistic, metaphysical or psychological.
In terms of the question of whether my informants pursued an individualistic subjective or a universal objective 'Islamic' requirement, it may be concluded that they were predominantly in favor of the former. However, the extent of subjectivity among them was not the same, as is to be expected. Therefore, I have compared the degrees of their subjective spiritualism from various angles, as outlined below. That is, individualized or semi-individualized 'spiritualistic Islam' in the context of modern Iran takes various forms: venues, conceptualization of and relationship with 'saints', outward appearance of participants, impact of mass and social media, language, 'art' and 'music', and architecture. These different forms are designed to check to see whether Iranians in the modern context express the kinds of spiritualist tendencies predicted by the theory. What I find is that they do indeed express such tendencies, as in many other societies. Furthermore, what I find is that within the Iranian context, the popular meaning of 'religion' has changed since the revolutionary period.
Diversification of 'Islamic' Venues
As mentioned above, our informants did not restrict themselves to mosques as the only 'official' venue of organized Islam to perform their 'Islamic' commitments or sensations. They now have many choices: Imamzadehs, maqbarahs, Hussainyehs, Tekyes, university, streets, and even their own private spaces within their homes. That is, they did not feel required to follow the objective rules of institutionalized and/or politicized 'Islam' to use mosques in order to perform 'Islamic' collective prayers and rituals. Each individual chose the most appropriate venue for him or her at a particular time. Regardless of the kind of venue that is selected, 'spiritualism' (ma'anaviat-garaei) has taken different meanings:
(i) The foremost meaning of 'spiritualism' is an 'expression of personal feelings' or 'self-reflection', especially when a private space at a household is selected, for the purpose of 'acquiring inner peace' (frequency = 17). something psychologically and they fear loneliness and [therefore] they need to fill their psychological vacuum . . . ' (An educated 25-year-old man.) (ii) 'Spiritualism' is related to the meaning of 'genuineness' and 'coming from the heart' aspect of so-called 'religious' activities, which avoids any form of 'religious formalism' and 'duplicity' and 'two-facedness' ('ria va tazvir') (frequency = 5).
a. ' . . . If I want to choose to attend an event, I will choose one [in a venue] that is more genuine in terms of their [religious] intentions and lacks any religious formalism.' (A 23 year-old male student.) b.
' . . . I choose a place in which there is no duplicity (ri'a) and formalism (zaher-sazi). One that [is genuine and] comes from the heart . . . I also like to make pilgrimages to the tomb of Imams . . . ' (An educated 24-year-old man.) (iii) 'Spiritualism' is not just related to other-worldly demands and expectations. It embraces both this-and other-worldly needs (frequency = 3), although some may prefer 'simple' places to other venues due to the current difficult economic conditions (frequency = 2). However, this does not mean that their form of 'spiritualism' is solely 'other-worldly'. This was particularly clear when our informants chose Imamzadehs as their 'religious' venue. This form of 'spiritualism' is particularly related to circumstances when one is 'depressed of and exhausted by the troubles of [this] world and needs a simple [peaceful] place' and therefore makes a pilgrimage to Imamzadeh's tombs as they are 'easily available' and they were believed to be 'simple persons', suggested an unemployed twenty-five-year-old educated woman. This may sound highly other-worldly. Yet, it is not explicitly chosen, as in Sufism. Rather, it is imposed by the deeply stratified social structure of contemporary Iran, in which some Iranians, such as the above-mentioned woman, resort to 'spiritualism' for gaining some peace. This is confirmed by another informant, a forty-five-year-old housewife, when she refers to 'not returning home with an empty hand', i.e., being answered to for usually mundane requests, as a reason for attending the tombs of Imamzadehs or mausoleums. (iv) 'Spiritualism' means a direct association and a 'private conversation with God (raz va niaz ba koda)'
and feeling Him, without any mediation (frequency = 2). This meaning of 'spiritualism' may also embrace mundane issues. (v) The final form of 'spiritualism' in association with venues is related to so-called 'musical' aspects of 'Islamic' festivals, such as playing drums or the flute, requiem (nouheh soraei) or rhythmic recitation of the Qur'an (frequency = 3). It should be noted that playing musical instruments, such as drums and flutes, are considered 'haram' or 'forbidden' in 'Islamic' jurisprudence or shari'a. This will be elaborated on in more detail below.
In order to identify and understand the relationship between a chosen venue and 'spiritualism', I have tried to roughly quantify the subjective elements of my informants' interviews in terms of the venues they chose for their 'Islamic' practices in the hope that it may make the comparison more helpful. The highest degree of subjectivity belongs to those who selected or preferred their private space at homes for 'spiritual' sensations (frequency = 6) and those who no longer had any 'religious feeling' or belief at all (frequency = 1). This group's subjectivism may be quantified 100%. The next group that scored highly for subjectivism comprised those who chose Imamzadehs with 84% (frequency = 6). The third highest degree of subjectivized practices or rituals belongs to those who had no preference in choosing venues (frequency = 10). They treated all venues as equal and their choice depended mostly on the 'quality' and the 'convenience' of the 'Islamic programs' on offer. They scored 70% for subjectivism. Finally, the least amount of 'subjectivism' belonged to those who selected or preferred mosques for their 'Islamic' or 'spiritual' practices and emotions with a degree of 50% (frequency = 7).
Conceptualizations of 'Saints' (awli'a)
In addition to 'Islamic' venues, 'modern spiritualized Islam' in the Iranian context is also associated with the perception and conceptualization of important 'Islamic' figures or 'saints', such as the Prophet, twelve Imams (for Twelver Shi'ism), their descendants (Imamzadehs) and other 'spiritual figures', such as Sufis. Imamzadehs and 'spiritual figures' are perceived to be remarkably close to the divine, the Prophet and Imams. They are allegedly capable of portraying this closeness by performing miracles, especially curing (physical intercession). These 'saints' are also theoretically considered as 'mediators' between the divine and ordinary people. From this perspective, there is a commonality between 'modern spiritualism' and 'Sufism'. Indeed, it seems that pilgrimage to 'Imamzadehs' have become a dominant discourse in present-day Iran.
This research shows that my informants' understandings and definitions of these 'spiritual figures' have become so individualized and subjectivized that some of their 'constructions' may even attract dangerous allegations of blasphemy and, as a result, capital punishment. Their contextualized and individualized characterizations of different 'Imams' and/or 'Imamzadehs' can also be controversial, from the perspective of classical 'Shi'ism':
(i) 'Saints' as 'ordinary human beings' (frequency = 6): this group of individuals, who have selected their private spaces in their households for their 'religious activities', tended to bitterly desacralize 'saints' by calling them 'ordinary human beings' and sometimes even insulting them, such as:
a. 'all Imams were cowards, with the exception of Hussain, who was a brave man, and Ali, who considered all people innocent unless their guilts were proven.' (An educated 24-year-old woman.) b.
'I don't even know the Imams' names, apart from a few . . . We don't hear that Hussain was a "free man" anymore . . . and he had nothing to do with people's religion . . . Ali was a violent person . . . I laugh when I hear "Hidden Imam" . . . Imamzadehs are tools for entertainment by the government.' (A 23-year-old male student.) c.
'I have no imagination about them. I have not experienced them.' (An educated 24-year-old woman.) d.
'They were good people, like figures in other religions [implying that they were not special].' (An educated 30-year-old man.) e.
'I have nothing to do with Imamzadehs, but I like Imams, especially Ali and Hussain for their spiritualistic and humanistic characters.' (An educated 45-year-old woman.) f.
'They have done something that God has asked them to do [implying that they did not choose to do good things independently from God].
[Therefore] they have no superiority over us. They were people like us.' (A 26-year-old female student.)
Indeed, all these conceptualizations mirror the societal conditions of contemporary Iran-of which, this group of informants were brutally critical.
(ii) 'Saints' as 'innocents', 'examples', 'mediators' and 'great personalities' (frequency = 16): these are usually considered 'classical' characterizations of 'Imams' and/or 'Imamzadehs' (without the feature of 'innocence' for Imamzadehs). These characterizations were usually used by those who choose mosques, Imamzadehs and those who gave no preference to any particular venue. In contrast to point (i), these features go beyond features of an ordinary person. Having said this, the subjectivized and individualized conceptualizations of these 'saints' are noticeable among these informants too, even among those who chose or preferred mosques over other venues: Although these informants' conceptualizations of 'saints' mirror the classical understanding of Shi'ite figures in general, their specific and selective characterizations of these 'saints' are indicative of an 'individualized and subjectivised Shi'ism' that is to a great extent critical of both the post-revolutionary 'Islamism' and pre-revolutionary 'Islam', which tended to respect all Imams equally, in the context of the contemporary Iran.
(iii) 'Saints' as 'saviors and helpers' (frequency = 4): this meaning of 'saints' seemed to be an emerging trend. Due to perhaps economic difficulties and hardship within society, there was a tendency to the view that there is no use in 'crying' for or 'mourning' Imams' death in their commemorations. If one wants to be 'faithful' or 'spiritual', s/he should help people, as the 'Imams' supposedly did: As we see, a 'spiritualistic Islam' in relation to the conceptualization of 'saints' in today's Iranian context has taken mainly three forms: desacralization, differentiation between Imams mirrored by the conditions of society and/or making them relevant to their individual circumstances and needs.
Relationship with 'Saints' (awli'a) and 'Religious' Experience
Given the respect that many Iranian Shi'ites have towards their 'saints', especially Imams and their descendants, it is also important to know why, how, when, where and how often they 'socially construct' their relationship with their perceived 'saints' and how a 'religious' or 'spiritual' experience occurs. Although, some of them may attend a collective ceremony or ritual on certain occasions, such as Ashura and Qadr Nights 3 , they emphasized that they do so in order to have a 'richer' individualistic 'spiritual' experience in such ceremonies-not in order to be a part of a group identity or to take part in collective religious behavior. Interestingly, I did not find a sharp contrast between the experiences of those who selected private spaces and those who chose other venues in this respect. However, the members of the former appeared stricter than those of the latter in avoiding public spaces even during such important occasions. In any case, a great degree of these experiences may be characterized as part of individualized and subjectivized 'spiritualistic Islam':
(i) 'Facing social or personal problems' (frequency = 16): The high frequency of 'problems' as a reason for having 'religious' or 'spiritual' experience among this group of individuals indeed illustrates the contextualized feature of these experiences and the difficult social conditions they lived in. Twelve, out of the sixteen, were women. In addition, these individuals tended not to allocate a specific time or occasion for having their 'religious experience' and connecting with the divine or the 'saints'. They did it as they felt they needed. Interestingly, the majority of these individuals is composed of those informants who suggested that they had no preference in choosing a specific venue. Some examples of the statements in this regard are as follows:
a.
'I see sometimes injustices and I wish Imam Ali was here. Since I have no access to him, I go and talk to his descendants, i.e., Imamzadehs.' (An unemployed, 24-year-old educated woman.) b.
'When I face a problem and I need something, I go to Imamzadehs as I am aware that there are more positive vibes there. This is the case with the Imams' shrines too. There is more hope [in shrines, as opposed to mosques] that your requests will be answered.' (An educated 33-year-old housewife.) c.
'When I face an issue or difficulty [and] (ii) 'Special occasions' (frequency = 11): Unlike the above-mentioned informants, these individuals restricted the definition of 'religious experience' to specific festivals and occasions. Some of them emphasized that they had a lot to do for the rest of their time. Therefore, they could only afford certain times for such a relationship and experience, i.e., in specific occasions that are 'religiously' considered to be important, such as the days of Tasu'a and Ashura (9th and 10th Moharram, when it is believed that the third Imam, Hussain, and his seventy-two helpers were martyred), the Qadr Nights and perhaps the Prophet's and/or other Imams' death anniversary ceremonies. These individuals can be found across all selected or preferred venues. In other words, these occasions were considered important for many informants. However, seven informants, out of 3 Many Iranian Shi'ites commemorate three nights of Ramadan (17th, 19th and 21st) by staying up alone or attending gatherings at 'Islamic venues' for prayers and reciting the Qur'an as they believe that the Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet on one of these three nights. These nights are called the 'Qadr Nights' (the grand nights) or 'Ahya Nights' (the awake nights). As we see, 'subjectivized spiritual Islam' has taken a variety of forms ranging from responding to personal needs to no need at all.
Constructions of 'Outward Appearance'
It was important to find out the implications of 'spiritualized Islam' on individual behaviors in relation to their outward appearance when the informants wanted to attend an 'Islamic' ceremony and/or having a 'spiritual' experience. Did 'spiritualism' mean making alterations to their appearance? This question was important because it was traditionally a norm that men and women wore black clothes in Moharram (and even a part of the next Islamic calendar month, Safar) and men did not shave their beards on certain 'religious occasions', such as Tasu'a and Ashura. In addition, it was important to assess the extent to which present-day Iran is influenced by a culture of 'simplicity' stressed by Sufism and/or global forces and late modernity. My findings show that individual behaviors are not unanimous and uniform. Although the majority of the informants pursued a subjectivized approach towards choosing how to appear, there were some informants who acted objectively in this regard (frequency = 23 vs. 6). That is, it mostly depended on each individual to choose how to express their 'religious experience' on these 'Islamic occasions'. Indeed, given the high respect of Iranian Shi'ite Muslims to Imam Hussain and the commemoration of his death by changing their usual outward appearance in the past, the greater degree of an individualized approach in this regard was rather surprising. 'I do not change my outward appearance. Some people may grow a beard or wear black shirts, but I do not do these things.' (A 23-year-old male student.) (ii) 'Formal, nice and clean' (frequency = 5): These individuals paid most attention to their appearance on such occasions, as though they were visiting relatives or friends. In fact, it was considered an opportunity to show off, especially when they were attending a 'religious' ceremony in a household. It was interesting that most of these informants later mentioned that they would rather use internet and satellite TV for their 'religious knowledge' than state TV. (v) 'Following "Islamic" orders [mainly meaning shari'a or tradition]' (frequency = 6): It would not make that much difference for this group of individuals where and in what type of ceremony they wanted to attend. It was just important to objectively observe the appearance requirements of 'Islam', such as strict hejab and wearing black shirts, not just for that certain ceremony but for a period of time, ranging from 10 days to two months during the Islamic months of Muharram and Safar. The latter (wearing black clothes) was viewed as a requirement of tradition, but not the shari'a. ' . . . In the martyrdom days, I wear a black shirt. When I was young, I grew a beard too, but I do not do this these days.' (A 54-year-old man.)
As we see, although there is an observable level of objectivity towards the requirements of tradition and culture, rather than those of Shari'a, in relation to outward appearance, a greater extent of subjectivized and individualistic 'Islam' is portrayed in this regard compared to the revolutionary and pre-revolutionary eras.
The Impact of Mass and Social Media
In addition to the diversification of 'Islamic' venues, Iranian TV or radio as well as the internet and a variety of social media contributed to the individualization of 'Islam' among my informants, in cases when they were not able to physically attend 'Islamic' festivals. Indeed, this dimension sheds further light in terms of differentiating between 'modern spiritualism' in late modernity and traditional or medieval spiritualism.
Internet and social media (frequency = 7): The usage of internet and social media, including Facebook, was important among some of my informants who valued 'spiritual sensation' (hess-e ma'anavi). This was because an individual had more options to pursue his or her own personal desire in terms of what they considered as 'Islamic' in the form of film, documentary, an 'Islamic' figure's homepage, sermons or a recorded festival. They were also described as 'useful tools' for communication purposes.
a.
'[In addition to TV and radio], the internet is also an effective and accessible mass medium in our time and its religious materials are more colorful. For example, our group is active on Facebook and other mass communication apps. We utilize the internet for informing people about our programs or disseminating them. Even those who had already been attending the group's programs and can no longer do so for some reason are now able to follow our programs virtually.' (A 26-year-old male student, who was active in the organization of a so-called 'Mourning Group' (hey'at-e azadari) in his local area.) Of course, if the internet carries our national religious characters, they would certainly be more effective than TV. This is because TV has limits but internet has a global and interactive feature that is more effective than TV.' (An 18-year-old male student.)
TV and radio:
In contrast to the internet and social media, views on the usage of TV and radio for 'Islamic' purposes were divided. Thus, in addition to the internet and social media, TV and radio has also contributed to the diversification, subjectivization and individualization of 'Islam'. As we see below, my informants' reflections of what counts as 'Islam' as broadcast from State TV and radio are not the same:
(i) 'Positive and influential' (Frequency = 11): These informants did not appear to be critical of State-provided programs, especially those broadcast from TV. They enjoyed watching 'Islamic' festivals or ceremonies, although they preferred to physically attend their favorite ceremonies in person and to be a part of a particular event.
( ' birthdays] or mourning ('aza), crying is on the agenda. Whenever we turn on the TV, a mourning ceremony is on or a film is shown on war and the martyrdom of our children. All this has made our youth loath war and the majority of them avoid Islamic Republic TV. This is because it shows news of the dead, war, blood and crying. Our children hate crying and sorrow. It is no different on local TV.' (A 50-year-old with a general education.) (iii) 'Both positive and negative or partially influential' (Frequency = 7): These informants conditionally approved some such programs, but not all of them. For them, some programs can be so 'negative' that could even 'put you off any religious belief'. These informants watched such programs only if they were not able to physically attend 'Islamic' ceremonies. Two, out of thirty, informants had no preference on whether to use State-provided mass media or to physically attend the festivals in person. For them, it depended on their feeling at that particular time.
The 'Shi'ite Requiem' ('Maddahi') and Language
This aspect of research focuses on the question of how different and diverse my informants, who are from various social backgrounds, 'construct' the definition of the 'Shi'ite requiem' and describe change (and continuity) in the 'religious' language of Shi'ite festivals, especially requiem lyrics (nouheh) during Tasu'a and Ashura. It was interesting that nearly all of my informants confirmed changes in the mood and content of these 'Shi'ite' songs, which distinguished them from those of the 'revolutionary' ('Islamism') as well as, the pre-revolutionary era ('Islam'). In both revolutionary and pre-revolutionary eras, all musical instruments, as 'religiously'-forbidden, were avoided. Contemporary 'Shi'ite' rituals have not only reconsidered the 'prohibition' of musical instruments but also attempt to convert the content and tune of requiems so that they are closer to 'non-religious' songs that are theoretically 'prohibited' in 'Islamic', including 'Shi'ite', jurisprudence or shari'a as symbols of 'moral corruption'. For my informants, the reason behind this is that festival organizers would like to attract the attention and participation of the youth at their 'religious' ceremonies. It is interesting that, as far as I am aware, no Shi'ite jurist (foqaha), whether traditional or political (including the Islamic Leader himself), has yet objected to this. As we will see below, such changes have also contributed to the further fragmentation of 'mourning collectivities' (hey'at-haye azadari) and the individualization of 'religion' in the contemporary Iranian societal context. Indeed, responses to change in 'Shi'ite' requiems have taken various contextualized and subjectivized forms: (i) 'Shi'ite Requiem' as 'knowledge' (Frequency = 6): There is a considerable trend among Iranian youth or the second generation after the revolution in questioning the emotional aspects of 'Shi'ite' festivals, particularly their crying segments. These individuals are more concerned with the 'reason' aspects of these festivities than its emotional aspects; e.g., why Hussain 'chose' death if he knew that it was going to happen? What was his message? Or did he really choose death?
To what extent are the current narratives authentic? These questions go beyond the traditional simple answer of: 'he sacrificed himself in order to save Islam'. 'The foundation of requiems are lyrics and words and the ways in which they are expressed. Of course, rhythm and music are so important that without them the words would not be able to bring about the desired effect.' (An educated 26-year-old man.)
(v) 'Requiem' as 'global Islamism' (frequency = 1): There was only one informant who thought that Shi'ite festivities are good instruments for converting the world towards the interests of Iranian Shi'ism or 'Islamism': 'If the language of requiems is clear and understandable, it will be excellent. It will attract many audiences. In addition, if they are presented in epic and non-superstitious ways, they will surely be more enjoyable. The advantage of [expressing requiems with] lyrics and words is that if they are translated to other nations' languages, real Islam will be known and will govern the world.' (An educated 45-year-old man.) (vi) 'Requiem' as 'language' and culture (Frequency = 13): Many of my informants preferred the requiems to be presented in their local language, i.e., Azarian Turkic, rather than Persian or Arabic. They did so not necessarily out of ethnic nationalist desires, which was the case for a few informants, but mainly because of the discourse with which they had grown up. Indeed, the vast diversity of the conceptualization of 'Shi'ite requiems', as demonstrated above, is indicative of a dramatic shift from traditional religious festivities to a 'modern' one, which is far from the 'religious' requirement of the organized Islam practiced before.
The 'Construction' of 'Art' and 'Music'
The world of 'art', in general, has always been separate from that of 'religion' in both pre-and post-revolutionary Iran, with the exception of some forms of art, which mainly appeared in architecture and calligraphy, that were called 'Islamic art'. According to shari'a, reflected whether in the form of 'Islam' or 'Islamism', some aspects of art are religiously forbidden and should be avoided; music is one of them. Playing some musical instruments, like a certain percussion dayereh, was described by the ulama as 'slapping the face of Fatemeh, the Prophet's daughter' in the pre-revolutionary period. Despite this, the majority of Iranians enjoyed listening to music or playing it. However, they considered this a part of the 'non-religious' aspect of their life, which they strongly distinguished from 'religious' requirements. That is, the social phenomenon of 'music' strictly divided the definition of 'Islam' from 'non-Islam'. For this very reason, all kinds of music were banned in public in the post-revolutionary era until Ayatollah Khomeini issued a religious decree (fatva) allowing some forms of music to play or listen to on the condition that they are played for 'revolutionary' and 'epic' purposes-not for 'gratifying' purposes that are concomitant with 'moral corruption'. This 'revolutionary' music was called 'soroud', instead of 'musiqi' or 'taraneh'. However, so-called 'non-religious' music gradually re-entered ordinary people's lives, although State TV and other elements of mass media are still restricted to broadcast 'soroud' and to avoid showing any images of music performance on TV. In the fourth decade of the Islamic Republic, as we saw above, it seems that 'music' has entered not only 'non-religious' aspects of people's life, but also the domain of 'religion' itself through the use of flutes and drums as well as a change in the form and content of requiems in 'religious' festivals. Moreover, the name of 'music' (musiqi) is not considered as dirty and 'sinful' as before. Indeed, neither of my informants used the term 'soroud' for 'music'. Nor did the informants avoid listening to 'music' on grounds of it being 'prohibited' by shari'a. 'Music' is not considered a 'taboo' and there is no longer such a divide between 'music' and 'religion', although people may still be aware of its prohibition in shari'a. This has led to many consequences and has furthered the diversification and individualization of 'Islam'. It was interesting that, despite the rather antagonistic policies of the Islamic Republic towards art in general, there was also a growing interest in other arts, such as drawing, film and dance, among some of my informants.
'Islamic' Architecture
In order to identify and understand any possible correlation between my informants' 'religious' sensation and architecture, they were asked whether a building's architecture was effective in their selection of attendance in that venue. Only two, out of thirty, informants described 'architecture' as uninfluential in absolute terms. The rest of my informants confirmed that a 'religious' architecture was important for experiencing an 'Islamic' sensation or 'spirituality', although it was not described as the only factor. -'The older the religious buildings are, the more spiritual and attractive they are.' (An educated 45-year-old man.) -'I am personally attracted to religious buildings with an old architecture, although the quality of ceremonies is more important. This is because I feel that they have been built with more sincerity and genuineness.' (A 25-year-old female student.) (c) 'Luminous and colorful buildings' (Frequency = 5): For these informants, the brighter and more colorful the buildings are, the more effective they are in inducing 'spiritual' feelings.
-'I would like to choose a [religious] venue that is luminous and lucid. I feel that the more luminous it is, the more spiritual it is . . . It need not necessary be luxurious. It can also be a simple place . . . [Of course] luminosity does not create spirituality in me. Spirituality is something related to my heart and is an inner property. The right architecture for me may increase my sense of spirituality.' (An 18-year-old pupil.) -'Spirituality is a personal matter. It is related to your heart. However, if I am situated in a venue that is more colorful, stylish and aromatic, I would not mind to stay there longer.' (A 54-year-old man with a primary education.) (ii) 'Identity' (frequency = 2): For two informants the 'Islamic' identity of buildings in terms of their architecture was important.
-'I am in favor of positive traditionalism in architecture . . . The more we distance ourselves from our own customs and culture, the poorer we become in terms of thoughts, beliefs and culture. Our religious identity becomes less colorful too.' (An educated 26-year-old man.) -'The architecture of a religious building should correspond to Muslims' lifestyles . . . The geometric style of Islamic architecture subtilizes and refines my soul.' (An educated 27-year-old man.) (iii) 'Equality' (frequency = 1): For one of my informants, an observation of gender equality in the 'religious architecture' of a building was crucial: ' . . . The old mosques were big. I like their entrances, minarets and domes. I like the pools in the middle of their gardens. It relaxes me, like my grandmother's house. I like the trees in their gardens too.
[However] I do not like their discriminatory separate entrance doors for males and females. While men use the main big entrance, women should enter the mosque through a small door in the corner . . . Even inside the building, women have a smaller space than men . . . This is not appropriate.' (A 27-year-old female student in architecture.) (iv) 'Subtle architecture' (Frequency = 3): a few of my informants defined 'religious architecture' in terms of their greatness and perhaps luxuriousness.
-'The very existence of a large and pretty mosque is indicative of the greatness of my religion . . . I have seen some mosques in Spain and Turkey to which I was very attracted. Since then, I have been thinking about why we do not pay attention to our religious buildings.' (A 24-year-old woman with a degree in architecture.) -'I do not like buildings with poor architecture. In fact, when I see Imamzadehs with a poor and simple building, I feel sorry for the saint who is buried there and I become sad.' (A 45-year-old housewife.)
Again, the question of what counts as 'Islam' in association with 'architecture' differs among my informants ranging from 'simplicity' and 'non-luxurious' to 'luxurious'.
Conclusions
Inspired by Beckford's (1989; 'social constructionist' theoretical approach towards the meaning of 'religion', this research illustrates how the definition of 'Islam' has changed in the Iranian context during the last forty years. The largely non-ideological institutional 'Islam' in the pre-revolutionary era became highly political and remarkably organized around mosques throughout the country during the revolution of 1977-1979 and the early post-revolutionary era ('Islamism'). On the fortieth anniversary of the Islamic revolution, this research demonstrates that contemporary Iran is experiencing a different definition of 'Islam' that is associated with 'spirituality', as defined by Beckford (2003, pp. 71-72; .
As the findings show, the 'sacred' has been 're-located', in Beckford's terms, from an organized and institutional 'Islam' during the pre-and the early post-revolutionary Iran to a profoundly 'fragmented', 'subjectivized' and 'individualized Islam' or 'spiritualism' in contemporary Iran. Such a 're-location' is easily visible across the various aspects of 'Shi'ite' everyday life, ranging from the 'diversification of "Islamic" venues' to 'Islamic architecture' in the Iranian context, as discussed above. Depending on my informants' age, gender, education, social status and class, and urban or rural birthplace, their experiences of 'spiritualized Islam' in various dimensions of everyday life has been 'constructed' in incredibly diverse forms. These forms not only go beyond the requirements of an institutional Islam, such as the objective obedience of shari'a and Shi'ite authority, but also dangerously oppose these requirements in some cases, such as those of conceptualizations of the 'Imams' and 'music'.
In addition, this research illustrates that there have been correlations between the independent variables of age, gender, education, social class and birthplace, on the one hand, and the individualized 'spiritualistic Islam', on the other. The younger my informants were, the more they were susceptible to 'spiritualism'-while the average age for the people with inclinations towards spiritualism was around 30, it was 36 for the people who were inclined more towards objectivized Islam. It was interesting that the forces of globalization and the societal conditions of theocracy is fully consistent with the findings of this research.
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